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NOTICE IS PREEMPTED FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS: FELDER v. CASEY
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,1 a successor of the Civil
Rights Act of 187 1,2 was enacted in response to a perceived un-
willingness of states to protect their citizens' rights.8 The statute
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be consid-
ered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
' Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1.17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
This act provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the
jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwith-
standing, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
Id. The act was aimed specifically at the activities of the Klu Klux Klan. See Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 358 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (statute set precedence in pro-
viding expansive protection under civil rights laws); see also Cong. Globe 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 653 (1871) [hereinafter Globe] ("[S]tates in the South ... have been unable to fully
provide. . . full and complete administration of justice in the courts.").
' See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overr'd on other grounds, sub nom. Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Due to discrimination, enforcement
of state law was questionable leading to federal legislation as a protective measure. Id. The
state's failure to address the protection of private rights led to the need for federal action.
Id. at 230 n.46. See also Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982). The
Civil Rights Act of 1871 guaranteed against invasion of one's fundamental rights by the
states. Id. By providing a federal remedy, Congress had opened the federal courts in re-
sponse to the failure of states to provide justice. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 111 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 (1972)
(predecessor of section 1983 intended to provide federal judicial forum).
State remedies were unsatisfactory because state courts were either prejudicial or incapa-
ble of protecting their citizens' rights. Blackmun, Section 1983 and the Federal Protection of
Individual Rights - Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5
(1985). See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871-Continuing Vitality, 40 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
70, 74 (1964) (claim authorized upon state abuse of public trust). See also Globe, supra note
2, at 321 (remarks of Rep. Stroughton) ("state authorities and local courts are unable or
unwilling to check the evil or punish the criminals"); Id. at 374 (remarks of Rep. Lowe)
("local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper
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provides direct access to a judicial forum to all individuals who
claim their constitutional or other federal rights have been vio-
lated by persons acting under color of state law." Beyond provid-
ing this right of access, section 1983 is silent5 as to notice of claim
corrective").
4 See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984). Civil right actions, the remedies of
which are separate and distinct from state law, "are judicially enforceable (in federal court)
in the first instance." Id. Section 1983 was intended to "throw open the doors" of the
federal courts, allowing immediate redress for civil right claimants. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504
(quoting Globe, supra note 2, at 476). See Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S.
234, 249 (1985) (Congress intended to enable civil rights litigants to proceed expeditiously
to court); McCurry, 449 U.S. at 112 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (section 1983 embodies
strong Congressional policy that federal courts are primary arbiters of constitutional
rights).
It has been argued that requiring individuals to exhaust their administrative remedies
prior to obtaining access to federal courts stands as an obstacle to one's direct access. Patsy,
457 U.S. at 509-10. The Act has been interpreted as providing "dual or concurrent fo-
rums" in both the federal and state courts, making it easier for the plaintiff to obtain relief.
Id. at 506. Accord Maine v. Thiboutat, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980) (section 1983 intended to
provide concurrent jurisdiction); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980)
(same). Therefore, the application of "state polic[ies] restricting remedies against public
officials" to section 1983 actions has been regarded as a frustration of the Act's objectives.
Burnett, 468 U.S. at 55 n.18. See Globe, supra note 2, at 376 (remarks of Rep. Lowe) (sec-
tion 1983 remedial objective is to be pursued notwithstanding any provision of state law to
contrary).
Federal courts have dispensed with certain state procedural requirements in order to
serve the purpose behind section 1983. See, e.g., Majette v. O'Connor, 811 F.2d 1416, 1418
(11 th Cir. 1987) (struck down requirement that plaintiff exhaust all other remedies before
bringing section 1983 action); Ehlers v. City of Decatur, 614 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir. 1980)
(federal courts cannot require exhaustion in section 1983 actions); Mathias v. Milwaukee
Dep't of City Dev., 377 F. Supp. 497, 500 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (same); cf. McDonald v. West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (section 1983 enacted to provide judicial proceeding to
protect individuals' federal statutory and constitutional rights); Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508
(when creating exception to no-exhaustion requirement by allowing it for institutionalized
individuals, legislature made clear that the general rule exhaustion of remedies is not re-
quired). State courts, however, have continued to apply exhaustion requirements to section
1983 actions. See, e.g., Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis. 2d 404, 417, 383 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Patsy
rationale has been construed to apply only in federal courts, leaving states to prosecute
their own procedural scheme), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 324 (1986). Kramer listed the benefits
of the exhaustion requirement as follows: (1) state agencies have the opportunity to correct
their errors, (2) it prevents premature judicial intrusions into agencies' activities, and (3) it
promotes judicial efficacy. Id. at 418, 383 N.W.2d at 59-60; Thompson v. Medical Licens-
ing Bd., 180 Ind. App. 333, 389 N.E.2d 43 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980) (fed-
eral court decisions that apply a no-exhaustion requirement are inapplicable to state court
section 1983 actions). But cf. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (participants in pending administrative proceedings in state
courts have diminished federal court access).
' See Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 601, 603 (1985). As a result of the silence, the federal courts are permitted
to fill in as they please. Id. See also Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). Justice
Frankfurter, in interpreting the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, argued
Felder v. Casey
requirements and statutes of limitation.
Notice of claim requirements are designed solely for the benefit
of a municipality to assure it adequate opportunity to investigate
claims.6 These requirements prevent citizens from taking undue
advantage by filing old claims of which the municipality was
unaware.
7
In establishing procedural rules for section 1983 actions, states
must comply with 42 U.S.C. section 1988,8 which allows the states
that absent statutes to the contrary, Congress intended to impose liability equivalent to that
of the common law. Id. But cf. LaHue, 460 U.S. at 349-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall argued that considerations other than the common law must be applied to a sec-
tion 1983 suit based on a federally guaranteed right. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (absence of procedural requirements probably
due to unforeseeability of what claim has come to entail); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183
(1984) (reliance on federal common law to elaborate immunity doctrine); Steinglass, The
Emerging State Court Section 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 450
(1984) ("the language and the legislative history leave many questions unanswered"); cf.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (Court often relies on policy consideration). See gener-
ally Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 499, 501-25 (1980) (on one hand, Congressional silence can be interpreted as
leaving issue to states, while on the other, it can be argued that by "negative implication"
Congress did not consider it); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 7 (1980)
(section 1983 litigation is unpredictable due to different interpretations).
' Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School Dist., 70 App. Div. 2d 94, 419 N.Y.S.2d 998,
rev'd on other grounds, 51 N.Y.2d 526, 414 N.E.2d 639, 434 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1980) (notice of
claim exists for benefit of government); In re Crespo, 123 Misc. 2d 862, 863, 475 N.Y.S.2d
319, 322 (1984) (notice of claim enacted to protect public entity); In re Huntley, 201 Misc.
426, 427-28, 106 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197-98 (1951) (notice of claim requirement designed
solely for city's benefit).
I Mills v. County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 451 N.E.2d 456, 458, 464 N.Y.S.2d
709, 711 (claim requirement serves important state interest by allowing governmental sub-
division a meaningful opportunity to investigate claim in a timely manner), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1018 (1983); Winbush v. City of Mount Vernon, 306 N.Y. 327, 333, 118 N.E.2d 459,
462 (1954) (gives municipality immediate notice so as to enable an investigation on merits);
Prude v. Erie County, 47 App. Div. 2d 111, 112, 364 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (4th Dep't 1975)
(notice prevents advantage being taken of government for old claims).
8 Title 42 U.S.C. section 1988 provides, in relevant part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title
"CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with
the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law,
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so
far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of
the cause .. ..
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to implement remedies for deficient provisions so long as they are
not inconsistent with federal goals. 9 The validity of the application
of notice of claim requirements to section 1983 actions created
substantial controversy because such an application's effect would
be to terminate numerous civil right actions that would have been
viable if brought in federal court.10 In response to this conflict, in
Id.
' See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 n.10 (1984). The Court adopted a three
step approach to guide courts trying to fill gaps in federal laws. Id. Firstly, the deficiency
clause of section 1988 requires courts hearing section 1983 actions to follow "the laws of
the United States" except "where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law." Id.
This has been interpreted to mean that a state requirement which proposes to meet a
deficiency in a federal statute may be valid if it is necessary for the cause of action. See West
v. Conrad, 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1542 n.6 (1987) (state procedure used if needed to fill neces-
sary gap); Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1507 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (whether
deficiency exists in federal law depends upon the necessity of state law to be borrowed); see
also Moor v. Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 701 (1973) (section 1988 does not authorize whole-
sale transfers of state requirements into federal law). The Supreme Court has only found
temporal deficits in statutes of limitations, tolling and survival. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261 (1985) (statute of limitations); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478
(1980) (New York's tolling requirement upheld); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584
(1978) (Louisiana survivorship doctrine held applicable). Secondly, if a deficiency has been
discovered, section 1988 instructs courts to adopt the analogous state law. Burnett, 468 U.S.
at 48. Compare Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488 (Court used term "most analogous") with Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (court used the words "most appro-
priate"). Finally, the inconsistency clause of section 1988 requires rejection of borrowed
state policies that are inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983. Burnett, 468 U.S. at
48 (courts are to apply state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States").
In determining whether an inconsistency exists between federal and state law according
to section 1988, courts must not just consider statutes or the Constitution but the underly-
ing policies behind them as well. See Moor, 411 U.S. at 703 (look to principles developed in
common law); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969) (state law
applied because it was not inconsistent with federal statute). Many United States Courts of
Appeals have disagreed over the application of state notice of claim requirements to sec-
tion 1983 litigation. See, e.g., Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 1982) (no-
tice of claim requirements not applicable to section 1983 action), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821
(1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 973-74 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980) (failure to
present written complaint under section 1983 will not result in dismissal), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1123 (1981); Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1969) (failure to give
notice will not preclude civil rights claim); infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussion
of the remedial goals of section 1983 and notice of claim's cross purpose). Accord Stein-
glass, supra note 5, at 455. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 499.
'* See Indiana Dep't of Public Welfare v. Clark, 478 N.E.2d 699, 702-03 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (Indiana notice of claim requirement applies to federal civil rights actions brought in
state court), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2893 (1986); 423 South Salina Street v. City of Syra-
cuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 488, 503 N.E.2d 63, 70, 510 N.Y.S.2d 507, 514 (1986) (federal civil
rights action dismissed in state court for failure to comply with notice of claim statute),
appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1880 (1987); Mills v. County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307, 451
Felder v. Casey
Felder v. Casey,"' the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's notice
of claim statute 2 was preempted by the supremacy clause because
of its cross purposes with section 1983's remedial scheme" and
the nonuniform outcomes produced based solely on whether the
action was commenced in state or federal court.
In Felder, the petitioner, Bobby Felder, alleged that he was
falsely arrested and attacked by police officers for racially moti-
vated reasons.14 Nine months after the incident, petitioner filed
an action in state court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the
city of Milwaukee and its employees. 5 Respondents moved to dis-
N.E.2d 456, 464 N.Y.S.2d 709 (upheld notice of claim requirement in state court action
brought under section 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
Each state has the power to prescribe the rules of practice in federal right cases as well as
in state cases. John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583, 585 (1913). See F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 774 (1982) (if Congress has power to preempt state procedure, it will take away
state sovereignty); Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis. 2d 404, 417, 383 N.W.2d 54, 59 (state
rules of procedure control in courts within the state, whether it is federal or state cause of
action), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954) ("the general rule bottomed deeply in belief in the
importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state
courts as it finds them"). Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (failure to make
timely objection under state's time requirement for confession bars federal habeas corpus
review); Dice v. Akron, C & Y R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 368 (1952) (plaintiffs' choice of whether
to bring their Federal Employers Liability Act action in federal court does not justify pre-
emption of state procedural rules); Mayer, Litigating Federal Constitutional Claims in State
Court, CALIFORNIA LAWYER July, 1986, at 81 (when state courts try federal claims they use
their own rules of procedure regarding "jury size, voir dire, challenges to the judge and
discovery"). But see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980) (strict procedural
rule which immunized state struck down); Robertson, 436 U.S. at 596 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (section 1988 does not restrict courts to state procedure even if there is no inconsis-
tency); Steinglass, supra note 5, at 455-56 (state courts cannot use procedures that will
hinder section 1983 claim). But cf Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945) (state characterizations of policies as procedural or substantive do not control choice
of law decisions).
" 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
WIs. STAT. § 893.80(1)(a) (1983 & Supp. 1987).
IS Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. at 2303. The statute is "characterized by broadly inclusive
language. [It does] not limit who may bring suit ...." Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50. See also
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966) (section 1983 should be accorded a
"sweep as broad as its language").
" Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2305. According to police reports, petitioner was charged with
disorderly conduct for yelling profanities and pushing an officer. Felder, 139 Wis. 2d 615,
617, 408 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1987). According to Felder, who is black, white police officers
struck him in the head and face with a baton, pulled him on the ground and placed him in
a police van in a semi-conscious state. Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2305.
" Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2305. Petitioner alleged that the City of Milwaukee, the chief-of-
police and certain police officers had violated his rights under the fourth and the fifteenth
amendments by intentionally depriving him of his civil rights while acting under color of
state authority. Id. The suit was brought after citizen complaints and a request by a local
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miss the suit on the ground that petitioner failed to notify the mu-
nicipality of his intention to bring an action against it in compli-
ance with Wisconsin's notice of claim statute."
The Milwaukee County Circuit Court granted respondent's mo-
tion as to petitioner's state claim1 7 and denied the motion with
respect to the federal claim.' 8 Although the respondent's motion
with respect to the federal claim was denied, the case was dis-
missed on the ground that it was barred by Wisconsin's two year
statute of limitation. 9 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed
the finding that the notice of claim requirement was inapplicable
to section 1983 actions20 but reversed on the dismissal of the fed-
eral claim finding the relevant limitations period to be three years
rather than two years.2' The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed,
viewing the notice of claim requirement as a legitimate procedural
device intended for the state's application in federal claims.21
alderman for an investigation of the incident resulted in no action taken by the police
department against any of its officers. Id.
16 Id. Wisconsin's notice of claim statute provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in sub. (1)(m) and (1)(p), no action may be brought or main-
tained against any ... governmental subdivision or agency thereof, nor against any.
employee of the . . . subdivision . .. unless:
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim, writ-
ten notice of the circumstances of the claim signed by the party .... is served on the
... governmental subdivision.., and.., employee .... Failure to give the requisite
notice shall not bar action on the claim if the . . . governmental subdivision or
agency had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of
the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not been prejudi-
cial to the defendant . . . or employee; and
(b) A claim containing the address of the claimant and an itemized statement of
relief sought is presented to the appropriate clerk . . . and the claim is disallowed.
Failure of the appropriate body to disallow within 120 days after presentation is a
disallowance.
WIs. STAT. § 893.80 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
1 Felder, 139 Wis. 2d at 619, 408 N.W.2d at 21. Petitioner's state claims were for false
arrest, assault and battery, false imprisonment and conspiracy. Id.
is Id. The court reasoned that Wisconsin's notice of claim statute was not intended to
bar federal civil rights suits. Id.
'" Id. The court used Wisconsin's two year statute of limitation applicable to intentional
torts, rather than the three year statute of limitation applicable to personal injuries gener-
ally. Id. at 619, 408 N.W.2d at 21-22. The application of the two year limitation effectively
time-barred Felder's action. Id. at 619, 408 N.W.2d at 21.
20 Id. at 619, 408 N.W.2d at 22.
"1 Id. The appellate court decided that the three year statute of limitation, Wis. STAT. §
893.54(1) (1983), should apply to petitioner's claim instead of the two year statute, Wis.
STAT. § 893.57 (1983), and therefore petitioner's claim was not time-barred. Id.
"' Felder, 139 Wis. 2d at 627, 408 N.W.2d at 25. The court reasoned that the applica-
Felder v. Casey
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,2 3 and in a
seven to two decision, reversed the judgment. 4 The majority
found that Wisconsin's notice of claim statute undermined the in-
tent of section 1983 by hindering the victim's ability to recover
rather than fostering it in accordance with the statute's remedial
purpose. 8 The Court further noted that notice of claim was not
an innocuous procedural device, but a substantive condition"
which altered the federal cause of action; beyond the state's au-
thority under the supremacy clause.2 7 Moreover, the majority
claimed that the enforcement of notice of claim statutes in section
1983 actions would be contrary to Congress' desire for uniformity
in such cases. 8
tion of notice of claim statutes was a rational rule which did not obstruct the federal cause
of action. Id. The court concluded that "litigants who choose to press their claims in state
court cannot 'elect' to ignore state procedural rules." Id. "The right to sue in state court is
accompanied by the corollary duty to abide by certain rules and procedures." Id.
Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 326 (1987).
Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
I' ld. at 2308. The Court stated that Congress, through section 1983, wanted to facili-
tate recovery against state governmental bodies and notice of claim requirements restrict it
by the imposition of conditions. Id. The notice requirement was prejudicial against the
precise type of claim Congress had created. Id.
Under Wisconsin law, a civil rights claimant must realize his injury and give notice within
four months of the occurrence while an intentional tort victim is allowed two years to
appreciate it. Id. at 2308. Civil litigants who are unable to realize their damage within this
short period are barred from recovery unless they can show that the defendant had actual
notice of the injury, the circumstances surrounding it, and the claimant's intent to hold it
responsible. Id. at 2308-09. This burden was found to undermine the civil rights statutes'
objectives of ensuring recovery and relief. Id. at 2307.
" Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2308. Notice of claim operates as a substantive condition prece-
dent in section 1983 actions brought in state court. Id. at 2309. It is not a simple proce-
dural rule but a vital part of the cause of action. Id. at 2310.
" William v. Posey, 475 F. Supp. 133, 134 (M.D. Ga. 1979) (notice of claim is condition
precedent which state cannot impose on claimant in civil rights action); Illerbrun v. Con-
rad, 216 Cal. App. 2d 521, 524, 31 Cal. Rptr. 27, 29 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (notice of
claim is not a mere procedural device, it is condition precedent to plaintiff's action); Wil-
liams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 841, 548 P.2d 1125, 1129-30, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453, 457-
58 (1976) (purposes underlying section 1983 "must still be served, and may not be frus-
trated by state substantive limitations couched in procedural language").
Under the supremacy clause state law is irrelevant if inconsistent with federal law. U.S.
CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
Supreme Law of the Land."). See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (According to
the supremacy clause "[t]he relative importance to the state of its own law is not material
when there is a conflict with a valid federal law .. "); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484
F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973) (construing federal statute to be subordinate to state immu-
nity defense would change fundamental right into "illusory promise"), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 917 (1974).
" 108 S. Ct. at 2312-14. The outcome, whether tried in federal or state court, should be
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, argued that the pre-
emption imposed on the notice of claim statute by federal law was
unsupported by the statute, legislative history and Congress,2" but
by an "ill-defined" federal policy formulated by the majority. In
addition, the dissent recognized that notice serves important func-
tions that in no way effect or diminish any substantive rights
under section 1983.0 Justice O'Connor concluded that Congress
never "created the right" for a plaintiff to have the benefit of se-
lected federal court procedures after rejecting the federal
forum. 1
This Comment will discuss the impact of notice requirements in
civil rights actions and their inherent incompatibility. It will then
analyze when a state practice such as this mandates preemption
under the supremacy clause. In addition, it will examine the
problems of non-uniformity that have arisen from the lack of
timeliness requirements. Lastly, it will discuss further steps needed
to acquire uniformity in section 1983 actions.
THE PURPOSE OF NOTICE
Notice of claim statutes serve legitimate state interests by al-
the same, therefore state courts have a duty to follow federal law in order to protect plain-
tiffs' substantial rights. Id. at 2313.
29 Id. at 2316 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor opined that the majority in-
corporated a subjective, unsupported view of the goals of section 1983 and developed a
new theory of pre-emption. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). There was no evidence that Con-
gress intended state procedural rules to be replaced with those that are used in the federal
courts. Id. at 2317 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority relied on "unenacted approv-
als, beliefs, and desires [which] were not laws." Id. at 2316 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1350,
1354 (1988)).
"o Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2318 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that the
statute enabled public officials to receive immediate notice of any wrongful conduct, al-
lowing them to conduct a prompt, accurate investigation, and to remedy the problem more
quickly. Id. at 2316 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent distinguished the
cases repeatedly quoted by the majority, stating that they were inapplicable because of
their commencement in federal court rather than state court. Id. at 2317-18 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
3' Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2318 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the
majority incorrectly concluded that the holding in Patsy, that state exhaustion of remedies
requirements were not to be applied in section 1983 actions brought in federal court, ex-
tended to actions brought in state court. Id. at 2317 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See infra
note 48 and accompanying text.
Felder v. Casey
lowing municipalities to promptly investigate claims, 32 take reme-
dial action if appropriate, provide some measure of financial sta-
bility"3 and protect employees of local government from litigation
expenses.3 4 When balanced against the federal interest in guaran-
teeing litigants with federal claims direct access to state courts,
preemption under the supremacy clause is mandated." Because
notice of claim statutes may conflict with section 1983's remedial
objectives of deterrence and compensation," their enforcement in
"' Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (notice func-
tions to allow municipal defendant to investigate), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985). See,
e.g., Murray v. City of Milford, 380 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1967) (purpose of notice is to
allow city officials time to investigate); Norland v. Mason City, 199 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Iowa
1972) (notice requirement enables "prompt communication of time, place and circum-
stances of injury to the municipality so investigation can be made while facts are fresh"); cf.
Cardo v. Lakeland Cent. School Dist., 592 F. Supp. 765, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (notice provi-
sions allow municipalities to decrease the amount of fraudulent claims through prompt
investigation); Mills v. County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 451 N.E.2d 456, 458, 464
N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983). But see Grubaugh v. St.
Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 176, 180 N.W.2d 778, 784 (1970) (circumstances have changed be-
cause now municipalities have liability insurance and legal departments which immediately
investigate accidents).
"' See, e.g., Patterman v. City of Whitewater, 32 Wis. 2d 350, 357, 145 N.W.2d 705, 708-
09 (1966). Notice of claim prevents unnecessary litigation and costs by "affording an op-
portunity ... to adjust all claims against municipalities before suit is brought." Id. (quoting
38 Am. JuR. Municipal Corporations § 74 (1968)). See Graziano, "Special Study, Recommenda-
tions Relating to section 50e of the General Municipal Law and Related Statutes", reprinted in
Twenty-first Annual Report of the Judicial Conference 358, 364 (1976). Whatever reason
a state may use for its enactment of a notice statute, what it boils down to is the protection
of public funds. Id. See also Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 650 (1987) ("Local government officials regard constitutional tort
actions as a serious threat to" state's economy); Couric, Police Become Targets of Malpractice
Claims: Suits, Verdicts are Mounting, NAT'L L.J. May 13, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (illustrates severe
financial impact on local budget).
See generally, Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act:
Does it Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?, 13 URB. LAW. 1 (1981).
"' See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962). According to the supremacy clause, the
importance of a state law is irrelevant if it is in conflict with a valid federal law. Id.
To interpret a federal statute as allowing a "state immunity defense to have a controlling
effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise," something that the
supremacy clause will not allow. Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974). Accord McGlynn v. New Jersey Pub. Broadcasting Auth.,
88 N.J. 112, 137, 439 A.2d 54, 67 (1981). See also Illerbrun v. Conrad, 216 Cal. App. 2d
521, 524, 31 Cal. Rptr. 27, 29 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (filing of notice of claim is sub-
stantive condition precedent which cannot be used in federal cause of action since
supremacy clause will preclude it).
" See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 591 (1978). The policies at the heart of
section 1983 are deterrence and compensation. Id. See also Steinglass, supra note 5, at 451
(when state policies are inconsistent with section 1983's purposes of compensation and de-
terrence they need not be followed). But see Cardo, 592 F. Supp. at 773. Notice rule is not
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that area should be precluded. A borrowed state policy must be
rejected if it inhibits section 1983's broad remedial scheme."
The first provision under Wisconsin's notice of claim statute is
an exhaustion of remedies requirement which mandates plaintiffs
to first seek redress from the offending state officials. 8 By prohib-
iting a claimant from commencing a court action before fulfilling
this condition, section 1983's primary objective of direct access is
thwarted. 9 The adequacy of the administrative remedy is irrele-
inconsistent with section 1983's remedies of deterrence and compensation because plaintiff
can recover after giving timely notice. Id.; 423 South Salina St. v. City of Syracuse, 68
N.Y.2d 474, 493, 503 N.E.2d 63, 73, 510 N.Y.S.2d 507, 517 (1986) (notice of claim has no
effect on deterrence since employee might be held to late notice that court allowed); cf.
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980) (principles of deterrence and
compensation do not justify federal court rejection of state tolling statutes).
" See, e.g., Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984) (civil rights statutes are character-
ized by broadly inclusive language enabling redress under various sets of circumstances);
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700 (1978) (section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act was enacted as remedy to be broadly construed); United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966) (section 1988 must be accorded "a sweep as broad as its
language").
State courts hearing federally created causes of action are required to apply policies con-
sistent with the purpose of the underlying statute. See Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.
R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1912) (for state court FELA cases state must follow policies consis-
tent with broad purpose of FELA and which do not burden litigation of claims); Steinglass,
supra note 5, at 452 (states must reject state policies which conflict with underlying pur-
poses of section 1983).
38 See Wis. STAT. § 893.80(l)(b) (1983 & Supp. 1988). No action can be brought or main-
tained until a claim is filed and disallowed by the municipality either by notice or by the
failure of the municipality to disallow the claim within 120 days after presentation. Id. See
supra note 4 (discussion of exhaustion requirement's obstructive effect on legislative intent
in civil rights actions).
" See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502 (1982). Administrative exhaus-
tion is not a precondition to filing section 1983 actions in federal court since the statute's
legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended to provide immediate
access to judicial forums. Id. See also Scott v. Unified School Dist. No. 377, 7 Kan. App. 2d
82, 638 P.2d 941 (1981) (no duty to exhaust administrative remedies); Williams v. Greene,
36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d 156 (1978) (exhaustion inapplicable to section 1983 cases);
Martin v. Harrah Indep. School Dist., 543 P.2d 1370 (Okla. 1976) (same). But see Kramer
v. Horton, 128 Wis. 2d 404, 407, 383 N.W.2d 54, 55 (must exhaust administrative reme-
dies before commencing court action), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 324 (1986).
Despite repeated statements in Supreme Court decisions that exhaustion of remedies re-
quirements in section 1983 actions were invalid, several courts have shown uncertainty. See,
e.g., McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975) (expressing that while exhaustion was
not required in instant case, in certain civil rights actions it may be); Kochie v. Norton, 343
F. Supp. 956, 960 (D. Conn. 1972) (dicta) (no Supreme Court decision has held that admin-
istrative remedies, if adequate, must be set aside for direct access to federal court).
Some courts have chosen limited exhaustion requirements. See, e.g., Secret v. Brierton,
584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978) (prisoner must exhaust grievance procedure before resorting
to litigation of litigation of federal civil rights action); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569
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vant 40 considering the constitutional right to immediate adjudica-
tion every civil rights litigant possesses.
The relative ease in substantially complying with the notice re-
quirement is insignificant since it affects the federal cause of ac-
tion in a burdensome form.42 Moreover, with the state of Wiscon-
sin's assertion that compliance with the requirement is determined
in a lenient and flexible manner,'" petitioner's failure seems un-
warranted.4 4 Concern over a state's subjective decision-making af-
(2d Cir. 1969) (exhaustion requirement valuable where adequate and speedy), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 841 (1970); Snuggs v. Stanly County Dep't of Pub. Health, 63 N.C. App. 86, 303
S.E.2d 646, 649 (1983) (no exhaustion rule is only applicable in federal court); Thompson
v. Medical Licensing Bd., 180 Ind. App. 333, 389 N.E.2d 43, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937
(1980) (Indiana state court held Supreme Court decision banning exhaustion requirements
to section 1983 actions inapplicable in state court). See also The Civil Rights of Disinstitu-
tionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 352 (1980) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1997(e)) (limited exhaustion requirement for prisoners bringing section 1983
actions).
"0 See, e.g., Patsy, 457 U.S. at 496. Exhaustion requirements are not justifiable solely on
the basis of policy reasons, especially since there is disagreement as to whether administra-
tive proceedings offer the most expedient, affordable and reliable remedy available. Id. at
513 n.15.
41 See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50. Civil rights actions are "judicially enforceable in the first
instance." Id. "The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people .... " McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (quoting
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
Federal courts have generally disallowed notice of claim provisions as an unwarranted
precondition to section 1983 litigation. See, e.g., Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 741-
42 (9th Cir. 1970) (Congress did not intend to adopt state remedies or procedures such as
California Tort Claims Act when determining federal rights); Perrote v. Percy, 452 F.
Supp. 604, 605 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (allowing notice of claim in section 1983 actions would
unacceptably raise state procedure above relief Congress sought to create in enacting fed-
eral right).
" See Wis. STAT. § 893.90(l)(a) (1983 & Supp. 1988). The statute provides that failure to
give the requisite notice will not bar the action if a municipality had actual notice and the
claimant showed that the government was not prejudiced. Id.
" See Sambs v. Nowak, 47 Wis. 2d 158, 166, 177 N.W.2d 144, 148 (1970) "[A] construc-
tion which preserves a bona fide claim so that it may be passed upon by a competent tribu-
nal is to be preferred to a construction which cuts it off without a trial." Id. (quoting Moyer
v. City of Oshkosh, 151 Wis. 586, 593-94, 139 N.W. 378, 381 (1913)).
Substantial compliance without a notice requirement is sufficient in most states so long as
the political subdivision has not been prejudiced. See, e.g., Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis,
253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225 (1970); Orr v. City of Knoxville, 346 N.W.2d 507 (Iowa
1984); Chicago Lumber v. School Dist. No. 71, 227 Neb. 335, 417 N.W.2d 757 (1988).
" See supra notes 39-40 (discussion of Patsy in terms of substantial compliance). Compare
Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988) (chief of police received letter from local alderman
advising him of incident and full investigation was commenced) with Lucas v. City of New
York, 91 App. Div. 2d 637, 637, 456 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (2d Dep't 1982) (city acquired
actual notice by virtue of police department accident report). In Lucas, the city failed to
show that it had been prejudiced by delay - something not even touched upon in Felder. See
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fecting a federal right was the reason for section 1983's enact-
ment.45 Clearly, Congress did not intend to leave such discretion,
with its potential for abuse, in the hands of the states."'
As the Felder court concluded, Wisconsin's notice of claim pro-
visions serve as a form of sovereign immunity4" in contradiction to
section 1983's broad remedial goals. A civil rights claimant suffers
a different type of injury,48 demanding distinct relief which can-
not be appropriately provided subject to notice of claim
conditions.
NOTICES CROSSCURRENTS WITH CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
The central statutory scheme for enforcing civil rights actions is
section 1988, which requires the implementation of state law
Lucas, 91 App. Div. 2d at 637, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 816, 817.
"5 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980). Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. section
1983 in response to a grave concern that the states were not protecting their citizens'
rights. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing states' historical failure to~take
initiative in protecting fundamental rights of United States citizens).
40 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (purpose of section 1983 was to provide direct
access to federal forum independent from state). Whether one has substantially complied is
a subjective determination by the political subdivision, leaving unbridled discretion with
the state, which would seem even more incongruous with the Congressional purpose be-
hind section 1983. Cf. Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir.
1980) (with regard to constructive notice the words "should have known" in statute refer
to court's interpretation of reasonableness); Reirdon v. Wilburton Bd. of Educ., 611 P.2d
239, 241 (Okla. 1980) (state court should not construe notice statute to defect ends of
justice); Mills v. County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307, 311, 451 N.E.2d 456, 458, 464
N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (state courts possess great flexibility in enforcing notice requirement,
leaving them with discretion in its application), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
"' See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(having traced notice of claim requirements to the legislative restoration of governmental
immunity, court struck them down), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073 (1985); Donovan v. Rein-
bold, 433 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1970) (same); see also Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d
834, 548 P.2d 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1976) (intent of notice statute is confinement of
potential governmental liability).
48 See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1984). Practical differences exist between
claims asserted under federal civil rights laws and claims asserted under state law. Id. Sec-
tion 1983 was intended to be enforceable independently of state remedies. Wilson v. Gar-
cia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985). The section provides a "uniquely federal remedy" against
intrusions by persons acting under color of state law. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239
(1972). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (deprivation of constitutional
right is substantially different from deprivation of analogous state right), overr'd on other
grounds, sub nom. Morell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But see John-
son v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). A federal civil rights action
is not so distinct as to preclude the application of state law. Id.
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where federal law is deficient."9 The Felder court never raised the
applicability of section 1988 since no deficiency was found to ex-
ist."0 It has consistently been held that before a state law may be
borrowed, the federal law being applied must be lacking with re-
spect to a procedure substantially related to the cause of action. 51
Unlike the statute of limitations, 2 tolling5s and survival provi-
sions," notice of claim is not essential to a fair trial. 55 Therefore,
49 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (pertinent text of section 1988). The Court
views section 1988 as governing choice of law in actions brought under sections 1981,
1982 and 1983. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462
(1975) (no relevant statute of limitation for section 1981 action, therefore use state statute
of limitation); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc., 396 U.S. 224, 240 (1969) ("federal and
state rules on damages may be utilized" to serve section 1988); Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (section 1988 implies state statutes of limitation will be used in
federal acts where Congress has not spoken).
', See, e.g., International Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966)
(when federal legislation is silent, state statutes are implemented); Brown, 742 F.2d at 1504-
07 (held notice of claims as not to be deficiency), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073 (1985); Wil-
liams v. Allen, 616 F. Supp. 653, 658 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (do not apply procedural rule of
forum state where application would extinguish federal right). But cf. Cardo v. Lakeland
Cent. School Dist., 592 F. Supp. 765, 772-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (no mention of deficiency
when choosing to apply notice provisions to section 1983 claims).
" See West v. Conrad, 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1542 n.6 (1987) (should borrow only what is
needed to fill gap in statute); Brown, 742 F.2d at 1504 (since borrowing presupposes need
to fill deficiency in federal provisions, court must initially determine if deficiency exists).
When a federal statute is quiet on a matter, it is the federal court's responsibility to fill
this gap in a constitutionally valid manner. See Moor v. Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 705 (1973)
(if federal law is insufficient, court applies constitutionally compatible state law); see also
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588 (1978) (if state law is inconsistent with Consti-
tution it cannot be used to fill gap). Cf. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580 (1973) (federal lawmaking is duty of federal court where legislation is incom-
plete). But see Brown, 742 F.2d at 1512 (Bork, J., dissenting). If federal law does not cover
the matter, it is deficient, and state law should be utilized. Id. (Bork, J., dissenting).
"' See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (federal cases must be brought within
reasonable time from accrual) (citing Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 342 (1805)). Statutes
of limitation are "universally familiar procedural aspects of litigation." Brown, 742 F.2d at
1506. Statutes of limitation are an integral part of the judicial system. Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980).
" See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 657 (1983) ("practice of 'borrowing' state
statute of limitation 'logically includes rules of tolling' ") (quoting Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980)); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 464 (1975) (borrowing of statute of limitation includes analogous rule of tolling).
" See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 584. The applicable survivorship rule governed by section
1988 instructs courts to look to state law. Id. The federal civil rights laws are deficient in
not providing for survival. Id. But see McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir.
1983) (state survival statutes of limitation under section 1983 are inconsistent with federal
law), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
Burroughs v. Holiday Inn, 621 F. Supp. 351, 354 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (irrelevant
whether notice of claim requirements are consistent with the federal action because they
are not necessary to fill any void).
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the mere existence of a state notice provision for which there is
no federal counterpart does not support a finding that the federal
law is wanting, since absence alone is not conclusive."
Federal courts are not predisposed to finding deficiencies in fed-
eral law because it would diminish the efficiency of the system.57 It
is submitted that if the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision had
been upheld, plaintiffs would be discouraged from litigating their
section 1983 actions in state court, and litigants in such actions
would have been effectively channeled into the congested federal
courts.
In federal actions, the procedural rules of the state in which the
court is located are generally used." Notice of claim is a substan-
tive condition precedent rather than a mere procedural require-
ment.59 State courts that entertain federally created actions may
not rely on state practices, whether characterized as procedural or
substantive, that affect the underlying purpose of the federal act.60
" Cf DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 n.20 (1983) (at
times, Congressional intent will be promoted the most effectively if no period of limitations
exists); Brown, 742 F.2d at 1507 n.5 (refused to read section 1988 as implying deficiency
whenever there is no federal law on matter).
57 See Brown, 742 F.2d at 1507 n.5 ("existing case law appears to find a deficiency only
where the particular type of provision in question is deemed necessary and reasonable");
see also Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588 (federal law is wanting when it is unable to provide
adequate remedies). Cf Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 553 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (civil rights actions in federal courts have increased in number from 270 in
1961 to over 30,000 in 1981).
" See Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, State Procedural Law, 69
HARV. L. REV. 66, 90 (1955) (federal courts follow Rule of Decision Act enforcing state
procedural law whether a federal or state cause of action). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (state characterizations of policies as "procedural or sub-
stantive" do not control choice of law decisions); Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 841,
548 P.2d 1125, 1129-30, 129 Cal. Rptr 453, 457-58 (1976) ("purpose underlying section
1983 . . . may not be frustrated by state substantive limitations couched in procedural
language").
59 Illerbrun v. Conrad, 216 Cal. App. 2d 521, 524, 31 Cal. Rptr. 27, 29 (1963). Notice
of claim is a condition precedent to plaintiffs maintenance of an action; an integral part of
the cause of action. Id. See Williams v. Posey, 475 F. Supp. 133, 134 (M.D. Ga. 1979).
"States cannot impose conditions precedent to the right of a plaintiff to proceed under a
civil rights action." Id. But cf. Hart, supra note 10, at 508 (federal law takes state courts as
it finds them).
" See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985). Congress did not intend to assign to
the courts a "conclusive role in the formative function of defining or characterizing the
essential elements of a cause of action." Id. See, e.g., Burnett, 468 U.S. at 53 n. 15 (limitation
period of one year could not be applied because it affected federal right) (citing Johnson v.
Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978)); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437
(1982) (state can impose reasonable procedural practices so long as opportunity to sue is
Vol. 4: 79, 1988
Felder v. Casey
THE ILLUSION OF UNIFORMITY
The Court's second objective in preempting the notice of claim
provision in civil rights actions was to produce uniformity among
the state and federal courts.61 As a result, states which possess
some type of notice requirement may still demand it for state tort
claims so long as the litigant is not bringing the action under the
Civil Rights Act.62 This is within the state's power since there is
no compelling federal interest involved and the states have legiti-
mate concerns which justify such requirements.6" While the aboli-
tion of the application of notice of claim statutes will increase uni-
formity in civil rights actions, it is submitted that the Supreme
Court's holding in Wilson v. Garcia,6 4 requiring each state to use
its personal injury statutes of limitation in section 1983 claims, will
meaningful). But cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (it is not essential that
plaintiffs state remedy be exactly the same as federal).
" See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275. In the interest of uniformity, section 1988 should be
interpreted to allow federal courts in each state to select a single statute of limitation most
appropriate for all section 1983 actions. See Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (1962) (if
individual state rights and limitations were applied to federal action it would cause inconsis-
tency and confusion); see also Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limita-
tions for Section 1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 440, 452 (1986). "A uniform statute
of limitations for section 1983 actions applicable to all states would ensure that all potential
claimants are treated equally." Id.
"' See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 11-47-23, 11-47-192 (1975 & Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-821 (1982 & Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-205 (1987); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
911.2 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-109 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7-465(a) (West 1972 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4013 (Supp. 1986);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-309 (1981); FLA. STAT ANN. § 768.28 (West. 1986 & Supp. 1988); GA.
CODE ANN. § 69-308 (Harrison Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 34-4-16.5-1 (West 1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.110 (Michie 1970 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8107
(West Supp. 1988); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-404 (Michie Supp. 1988); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 4 (West 1988); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1404 (West 1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.05 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 77.600 (Vernon 1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 13-905 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (1974 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 59:8-3 et seq. (West 1982 & 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16 (1978 & Supp. 1988);
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1988);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 156(B) (West 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.275 (1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 45-15-9 (1980 & Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-10 et seq. (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987); TEX. CIV. lRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-30-11 et seq. (1986 & Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 987 (1987); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.6 (1984 & Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.31.020 (1966 &
Supp. 1989); WYo. STAT. § 1-39-113 (1987 & Supp. 1987).
" See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing government's legitimate state
interests in enforcing notice of claim statutes).
" Wilson, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (all claims brought under section 1983 shall apply state
statute of limitation).
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 79, 1988
continue to produce non-uniform outcomes. In Felder, the Court
failed to address this inconsistency. 5
Statutes of limitation for personal injury claims differ among
the several states.6 Approximately half of the states have two lim-
itation periods for personal injury actions: a shorter period for
certain intentional torts, and a longer period for the remainder."'
In such cases, lower federal courts are split on which period to
apply.68 Therefore, since there is no federal statute of limitation
for section 1983 actions, 69 civil rights actions are not adjudicated
uniformly within the various states.
The federal law is in great need of a uniform period of limita-
tion for either all section 1983 actions or all civil rights actions in
general. 70 The closest the Supreme Court has come to creating
" See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593-94 n.1 1 (1978) (reliance on state law
inevitably means that no nationwide uniformity will exist).
Annotations, Civil Rights Claims: State Notice of Claim Requirement Can't Be Applied to
Federal Civil Rights Action, 344 NEW YORK STATE LAW DIGEST 5 (Aug. 1988). See, e.g., N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 315 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (one year for assault and violations of
privacy in New York); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (three years
for personal injury actions); TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. § 16.002 (Vernon 1986) (one year for
malicious prosecution, libel, or slander in Texas); TEx. CiV. CODE ANN. § 16.0003 (Vernon
1986) (two years for personal injury); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4) (1977) (Utah statute
of limitation is one year for libel, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(2) (1977) (four years "for relief not otherwise provided for by the
law"); VA. CODE § 8.01-248 (1984) (one year for malicious prosecution or abuse of process
in Virginia); VA. CODE § 8.01-243A (Supp. 1988) (two years for actions for personal
injuries).
" See Shapiro, Choosing the Appropriate State Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Claims
After Wilson v. Garcia: A Theory Applied to Maryland Law, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 242, 245 n. 18
(1987) (lists various states' statutes of limitation).
0 Compare Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986) (used general
personal injury statute, which is usually longer than tort limitation period) and Carroll v.
Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 (1986) with Mulligan v.
Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985) (used special limitation applicable for intentional
torts), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986).
" See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483 (1980) (Congress has not estab-
lished statute of limitation for federal actions pursuant to section 1983); Note, supra note
61, at 441 (Congress explicitly omitted statute of limitation for section 1983 actions).
70 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985) (simple broad characterization of all
section 1983 claims best fit the statute's remedial purpose); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462
U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Few areas stand in greater need of firmly
defined, easily applied" limitation periods than civil rights actions). See also Shapiro, supra
note 67, at 251 n.59 (only way to achieve uniformity in all section 1983 cases is if Congress
amends section 1988 and provides single statute of limitations period); Note, supra note 61,
at 452 (Congress should legislate specific limitation period for section 1983 actions). But see
S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 12874, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (representa-
tive Bells proposed to standardize section 1983 limitation periods failed).
Felder v. Casey
uniformity in the limitation period is in DelCostello v. Teamsters7 1
where it borrowed a federal statute of limitation period rather
than a state's.7 2 Not only is a federal limitations period vital for
uniformity, but, it is suggested that by allowing states to apply
their various statutes of limitation to federal claims, the Court has
given them a power which section 1983 was enacted to prevent7 3
States enact periods of limitation to further their own needs 74 not
to promote national concerns embodied in civil rights acts.
CONCLUSION
The dual purposes of section 1983 - direct access to a forum,
and uniformity - can only be achieved by either the Supreme
Court applying a chosen federal statute of limitation, or Congress
promulgating a federal statute of limitation for such actions. Limi-
tation periods dependent on analogous state statutes allow the
states to directly control civil rights claims. This state control may
lead to results which are manifestly inconsistent with the purposes
of section 1983. The preemption of notice of claim in civil rights
actions removed one obstacle, but without the removal of the
other by a federal period of limitation, the ultimate objectives of
section 1983 will remain thwarted.
Robin Singer
462 U.S. 151 (1983).
72 Id. at 162.
71 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing section 1983 objective of dilut-
ing state power by opening access to federal courts independent of state control).
"" See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983)
(state legislatures do not enact statute of limitations periods in furtherance of national con-
cern); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (same); see also Burnett
v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 58 (1984) (when enacting state statute of limitations, legislature
considers "the state policies underlying [them]" as well as their relationship to the state
objective); Shapiro, supra note 67, at 259 (reason that legislature chooses certain limitation
period may be irrelevant in determining whether it can be applied to federal cause of ac-
tion); Note, supra note 61, at 452 (state legislatures enact statutes of limitation to advance
their own interests).

